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FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE: A MODEL TO 
PROTECT PROTESTERS IN THE AGE OF 
SURVEILLANCE 
FARRAH BARA† 
ABSTRACT
In 1978, after two years of contentious litigation, the City of 
Memphis entered into a unique agreement with its citizens: it signed a 
consent decree, stipulating that it would halt its interference with First 
Amendment–protected activities. More specifically, the Consent
Decree barred the City from surveilling protesters—the very conduct
that triggered litigation. 
Fast forward forty years. In 2018, narratives of police brutality 
dominated the nation’s headlines. Consequently, protesters 
demonstrated from the streets of Ferguson, Missouri to Oakland,
California. And in Memphis, Tennessee, those who protested were
often met with an all-too-familiar response—surveillance by the 
Memphis Police Department. That is until the Western District of
Tennessee found that the City had violated the terms of its own 
agreement. The court’s message was undeniably clear—the Memphis 
Consent Decree is alive and well. 
Memphis is by no means an outlier in police–civilian relations. After 
all, police departments across the country surveil protesters. But 
Memphis is an outlier in terms of the method it has chosen to address
this issue. As the surveillance of protesters and the capacity to surveil 
protesters grow, the Memphis Consent Decree offers a model for future
legislation that better safeguards First Amendment values. This Note
accordingly narrates the story of Memphis, its successes and failures, 
and the lessons it holds for hundreds of cities, for decades to come. 
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† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected May 2020. University of Texas at Austin,
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198 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
“MPD has the opportunity to become one of the few, if 
only, metropolitan police departments in the country
with a robust policy for the protection of privacy in the 
digital age. The Court recognizes this may be a heavy 
burden; being a pioneer usually is.”1 
INTRODUCTION
Two hundred protesters gathered outside FedExForum in 
Memphis, Tennessee on the evening of July 10, 2016.2 In the wake of 
heightened police brutality across the country, the protesters arrived
with a simple message: they were “tired of the senseless killings of 
black people.”3 Half an hour later, the protesters marched north, 
climbed the ramp to Interstate 40, and shut down the I-40 bridge.4 By
6:30 p.m., several hundred protesters had assembled on the bridge; at
its peak, more than a thousand protesters; and by 10:45 p.m., zero.5 
At some point over those four hours, Memphis Police Department 
(“MPD”) Interim Director Michael Rallings appeared, accompanied
by a fleet of officers.6 Some protesters worried that violence would 
tread on the heels of the officers’ arrival.7 What followed was quite the 
opposite. In a powerful moment of solidarity, Rallings locked arms 
with the protesters and prayed.8 “I was truly concerned about the 
1. ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb, slip op. at 38
(W.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2018) (emphasis added) (footnote and citation omitted) (citing Rachel
Levinson-Waldman, Government Access to and Manipulation of Social Media: Legal and Policy 
Challenges, 61 HOW. L.J. 523 (2018)).
 2. Jody Callahan, Marchers Shut Down I-40 Bridge at Memphis During Black Lives Matter 
Rally, COM. APPEAL (July 10, 2016), http://archive.commercialappeal.com/news/
tennessee-black-caucus-calls-for-calm-amid-racial-unrest—3714d93e-1078-6a7d-e053-010000 
7f134e-386214081.html [https://perma.cc/ARN9-ZKHE].
 3. Id. (quoting protester Porshia Scruggs).
 4. Id.
 5. Id.; Yolanda Jones, Katie Fretland & Yalonda M. James, One Year Later: The Day 
Memphis Protesters Shut Down the I-40 Bridge, COM. APPEAL (July 7, 2017, 6:23 PM),
https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2017/07/07/bridge-one-year-later/431947001
[https://perma.cc/K7K6-AUAF] (noting that more than a thousand protesters were present at the
demonstration).  
6. Callahan, supra note 2.
 7. See Jones, Fretland & James, supra note 5 (“I was in shock, actually, a state of 
amazement; a little disbelief that we actually shut down the highway, and then a lot of that turned
into fear that dogs, water cannons and things like that was going to be used.” (quoting protester
Keedran Franklin)).  
 8. Kelsey Ott, Huge Crowd of Black Lives Matter Supporters Marches Through Memphis,
Shuts Down I-40 Bridge, WREG MEMPHIS (July 11, 2016, 12:04 AM), https://wreg.com/ 
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 199
legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.,” he later explained.9 “I thought I 
heard his voice saying get up there and try to get this resolved.”10 
That was about as wholesome as the story got. The day after the 
protest, Memphis Mayor Jim Strickland made this statement: “As 
Memphis mayor, I respect the Constitution and the right to assemble
peacefully in protest. . . . [But] [l]et me be clear: you can exercise your 
First Amendment rights without breaking the law.”11 Mayor 
Strickland’s professed adoration for the Constitution notwithstanding, 
MPD’s Office of Homeland Security (“OHS”)—originally created 
after 9/11 to combat terrorism—implemented a program to surveil
protesters.12 Officers tracked individuals who attended protests,
monitored their social media activity, and recorded protesters’ names 
and activities on OHS spreadsheets.13 Some protesters also ended up
on “blacklists,” which banned them from entering City Hall unless they
received police escorts.14 One protester even reported being followed 
by the police.15 
MPD is far from alone in its surveillance of protesters. Police 
departments across the country, from Oakland, California to Ferguson, 
Missouri, also monitor protesters.16 In fact, the list of groups that have
2016/07/10/interim-mpd-director-shows-up-to-black-lives-matter-rally [https://perma.cc/ZC3T-
RVLU].
9.  Jones, Fretland & James, supra note 5. 
10. Id.
 11. Ott, supra note 8 (quoting Mayor Jim Strickland). 
12. Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Civil
Contempt at 6–7, ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb
(W.D. Tenn. June 18, 2018).
 13. Id.
 14. Yolanda Jones, Activists See Vindication in Memphis Police Surveillance Court Order,
DAILY MEMPHIAN (Oct. 31, 2018, 11:46 AM), https://www.dailymemphian.com/article/987/ 
Activists-see-vindication-in-Memphis-police-surveillance-court-order [https://perma.cc/8CTW-
WNJF].
 15. Id. (discussing protester Keedran Franklin’s report of being followed by the police).
 16. Matt Cagle, Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter Provided Data Access for a Surveillance 
Product Marketed to Target Activists of Color, ACLU NORCAL (Oct. 11, 2016),
https://www.aclunc.org/blog/facebook-instagram-and-twitter-provided-data-access-surveillance-
product-marketed-target [https://perma.cc/FR5G-N9PX] (“[I]n Oakland and Baltimore, law
enforcement has used Geofeedia to monitor protests.”); Jessica Guynn, ACLU: Police Used
Twitter, Facebook to Track Protests, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2016, 12:44 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/10/11/aclu-police-used-twitter-facebook-data-
track-protesters-baltimore-ferguson/91897034 [https://perma.cc/FVB4-NGMM] (“Geofeedia
documents brought to light by the ACLU showed that police tracked protests in Baltimore in
2015 after the death in police custody of Freddie Gray, and protests in Ferguson, Mo., in 2014 
after the police shooting of Michael Brown.”).
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200 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
been targeted includes Black Lives Matter,17 Muslims,18 
environmentalists,19 the Catawba Nation,20 supporters of Palestine,21 
animal rights organizers,22 and even middle school students.23 Where 
protest exists, surveillance lurks closely behind. 
As “the rhizome of the ‘surveillant assemblage’ . . . steadily
grow[s] and deepen[s],”24 activists, scholars, protesters, and judges 
have all attempted to determine the extent of constitutional protection 
from surveillance. Intuitively, this kind of surveillance seems like a 
violation of the First Amendment’s freedom of assembly25 and the
Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizure.26 Indeed, activists and scholars have championed those 
arguments.27 But on the opposite end of the spectrum, several courts 
17. Sweta Vohra, Documents Show US Monitoring of Black Lives Matter, AL JAZEERA
(Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/documents-show-monitoring-black-
lives-matter-171128110538134.html [https://perma.cc/KM3L-KVNU].
18. Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, With Cameras, Informants, NYPD Eyed Mosques, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 23, 2012), https://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2012/with-cameras-
informants-nypd-eyed-mosques [https://perma.cc/GUV2-VGER].  
19. Alleen Brown, Will Parrish & Alice Speri, Dakota Access Pipeline Company Paid 
Mercenaries to Build Conspiracy Lawsuit Against Environmentalists, INTERCEPT (Nov. 15, 2017, 
1:34 PM), https://theintercept.com/2017/11/15/dakota-access-pipeline-dapl-tigerswan-energy-
transfer-partners-rico-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/B5CL-X8PS].  
20. Id.
21. ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb, slip op. at 22
(W.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2018).
 22. Glenn Greenwald, The FBI’s Hunt for Two Missing Piglets Reveals the Federal Cover-
Up of Barbaric Factory Farms, INTERCEPT (Oct. 5, 2017, 12:05 PM), https://theintercept.com/ 
2017/10/05/factory-farms-fbi-missing-piglets-animal-rights-glenn-greenwald
[https://perma.cc/5V9N-PJXK].  
23. Will Pierce, CIA-Backed Firm Touted Social Media Surveillance of Students to Sell 
Services to Evanston Police, SHADOWPROOF (Sept. 10, 2018), https://shadowproof.com/2018/ 
09/10/cia-backed-firm-touted-social-media-surveillance-of-students-to-sell-services-to-evanston-
police [https://perma.cc/MH28-2MN8] (“Skokie Police has been very successful in identifying 
drug related crimes as well as monitoring local middle and high schools 24/7.” (quoting Geofeedia
Representative Jon Newman)).
 24. Torin Monahan, Ambiguous Ambitions with Counter-Surveillance, MEDIUM (Sept. 24,
2018), https://medium.com/surveillance-and-society/ambiguous-ambitions-with-counter-
surveillance-e7784b2308eb [https://perma.cc/BTC9-68V4]. 
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.”). 
26. See id. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
27.  Professor Marc Jonathan Blitz is one of those scholars, explaining:
[P]olice engage in a Fourth Amendment search, even in public space, when they are 
not merely observing but also recording images or sounds of people. . . . Police engage
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 201
have rejected constitutional claims, noting in part that protesters are 
not protected from surveillance in cases where police departments 
merely track their public posts and activity.28 Because protests—and
assemblies generally—are inherently public, it would be unreasonable 
for protesters to have an expectation of privacy in those public
activities.29 
Caught in the crosshairs of constitutional ambiguity, the protesters 
of Memphis may have found a solution. They sued the city—and won.30 
The case they brought—ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of 
in a search simply by using technology with the capacity to create a record of people’s
movements and aiming it at certain individuals. Defining searches in public spaces in
this manner parallels the way that courts typically define Fourth Amendment searches
in private spaces.
Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth Amendment Future of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording 
and Other Searches in Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 28–29 (2013) (emphasis omitted). See, 
e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 747 (2008) (noting that, in addition to
Fourth Amendment concerns, “[t]he potential chilling effect due to relational surveillance poses
serious risks not only to individual privacy, but to the First Amendment rights to freedom of
association and assembly”); Amna Toor, Note, “Our Identity Is Often What’s Triggering
Surveillance”: How Government Surveillance of #BlackLivesMatter Violates the First Amendment
Freedom of Association, 44 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 286, 300 (2018) (“Thus, the 
government’s use of surveillance technologies . . . to monitor the activities of #BLM to detect
threats to national security, raises the same First Amendment associational freedom concerns as
COINTELPRO’s surveillance of the Civil Rights Movement posed.”). 
28. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3 (1972) (agreeing with the district court’s dismissal
of a challenge by protesters against surveillance because “complaining of a ‘chilling’ effect on the 
exercise of their First Amendment rights where such effect is allegedly caused, not by any ‘specific
action of the Army against them, (but) only (by) the existence and operation of the intelligence 
gathering and distributing system’” is not a justiciable constitutional claim); Pledge of Resistance
v. We the People 200, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 414, 418–19 (E.D. Penn. 1987) (refusing to grant a 
preliminary injunction against FBI photographic surveillance of protesters in public and noting 
that “none of this photographic surveillance activity could reasonably be considered a violation
of anyone’s constitutional rights”); cf. ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-
02120-JPM-egb, slip op. at 36 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2018) (“The Court recognizes that the City
granted its residents privacy rights above and beyond those guaranteed by the
Constitution . . . .”). But cf. Black Lives Matter v. Town of Clarkstown, 354 F. Supp. 3d 313, 323– 
24 (denying in part a motion to dismiss a First Amendment claim because “[w]hen confronted
with this threat of violence from the government at a peaceful Black Lives Matter rally, on top of
the illegal surveillance targeted against the group and its members, any reasonable person would
think twice before continuing to participate in Black Lives Matter”).
 29. See infra Part II (discussing the constitutional limitations). 
30. City of Memphis, slip op. at 1–3.
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202 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
Memphis31—was not, however, a constitutional victory.32 Instead, the 
protesters won because Memphis had violated a consent decree.33 In
1978, Memphis entered into an agreement with the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) that prohibited MPD from surveilling and 
collecting information related to First Amendment–protected
activities (speech, religion, press, and assembly).34 This Decree made
Memphis “the first, and perhaps only, city in the country with an
established policy for the protection of its residents’ privacy in the face
of ever-expanding techniques of electronic surveillance.”35 
Whether protesters are aware of surveillance or not, legitimate 
reasons exist to curb it.36 When known, surveillance can deter 
protesters from exercising their constitutional rights.37 When unknown,
“[c]overt surveillance risks equating political protest with criminal
activity.”38 As the surveillance of protesters accelerates parallel to the
31. ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb (W.D. Tenn.
Oct. 26, 2018). The litigation has been referred to by two names. As originally filed, the case was
called Blanchard v. City of Memphis, but the name of the case on which the district court 
eventually entered judgment was ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis. The name of the 
case changed because the original plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under the City’s Consent 
Decree, while the intervening plaintiff did have standing. This issue will be discussed more
thoroughly in Part IV of this Note. For ease of reference, the case will be referred to as City of
Memphis. 
32. City of Memphis, slip op. at 15 (“[T]he City agreed to obligations above and beyond
those required by the Bill of Rights.”).
 33. Id. at 1–3. Consent decrees are similar to settlement agreements. See infra Part IV.A.
Both parties agree to certain conditions that regulate future behavior, and the court can enforce
the decree at a later time in the same way that it would enforce a contract. See Rufo v. Inmates of 
Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (“A consent decree no doubt embodies an agreement
of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the 
parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree . . . .”).  
34. See infra Part III. 
35. City of Memphis, slip op. at 3–4. The author has only been able to identify New York
City as an additional city with a consent decree that protects protesters from surveillance, but that
decree was weakened by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in 2003. See 
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 273 F. Supp. 2d 327, 331–34, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing the 
contents of the Handschu consent decree and determining that changed circumstances warranted
amendment of the decree).
 36. See, e.g., Monahan, supra note 24 (“Data, once recorded, can be used to serve a myriad 
of ends, many of which are unforeseeable at the time of collection.”).
 37. Cf. Levinson-Waldman, supra note 1, at 524 (“[I]n an era when people use social media
sites ‘to engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity . . . [,]’ studies indicating
that online surveillance produces a chilling effect and thus may suppress protected speech,
association, and religious and political activity are of particular concern.” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017))). 
38. Nicholas Kusnetz, Harsh New Anti-Protest Laws Restrict Freedom of Speech, Advocates
Say, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/energy-environment/2018/ 
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 203
development of technology, the question remains: What happens next? 
While some scholars focus on the constitutionality of this surveillance, 
the successful protection of protesters in Memphis—made without 
reliance on the Constitution—indicates that other legal solutions exist, 
ought to be more fully examined, and provide a framework for 
potential legislative solutions.  
This Note picks up where existing scholarship leaves off. Using the
terms of Memphis’s Consent Decree as its foundation, this Note argues
that the best way to effectuate the principles behind the First 
Amendment’s protection of assembly in the age of technology is 
through legislation that regulates protester surveillance. It proceeds in 
four parts: Part I chronicles the evolution of protester surveillance 
nationally, discussing the disparate impact this surveillance has had on 
marginalized communities; Part II provides background on why 
constitutional arguments fall short of protecting protesters; Part III 
traces the origin of the Memphis Consent Decree and discusses its 
application in City of Memphis; and Part IV outlines a legislative
solution, grappling with some of the difficulties of implementation. 
Having explained what this Note is, what follows is an explanation 
of what this Note is not. This Note does not argue that surveillance is 
purposeless. Nor does it claim that cops are ill-intentioned in their 
pursuit and collection of surveillance. Quite the opposite. One can
easily imagine circumstances where surveillance is useful, needed even. 
And officers have tough jobs, often operating under “circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”39 But surveillance also 
carries serious costs, and if officers push “too aggressively[, they] may
undermine community relationships that are necessary to maintaining 
public safety and order.”40 Perhaps that is why the City of Memphis 
court noted: “The idea that police should be limited in their powers 
predates 2018 . . . .”41 In that vein, this Note offers one such limitation.
08/22/environmentalists-say-new-pipeline-protest-laws-restrict-their-freedom-speech/ 
?utm_term=.6b3d88aa0e90 [https://perma.cc/88GQ-MPRF] (citing Northwestern University
historian Keith Mako Woodhouse). 
39. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
 40. Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595,
1652 (2016). 
41. ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb, slip op. at 36
(W.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2018).
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204 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
I. THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN SURVEILLANCE
While it is difficult to pinpoint precisely when it began, the 
surveillance of dissidents and protesters in America is at least as old as
the country itself. Leading up to the American Revolution, young 
patriots voiced discontent with “unrestrained searches” by British 
officers.42 “Using ‘writs of assistance,’ the King authorized his agents to 
carry out wide-ranging searches of anyone, anywhere, and anytime
regardless of whether they were suspected of a crime.”43 This
surveillance formed the basis of the Fourth Amendment44: “The right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”45 
Despite the historical underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment, 
America took a “page from King George’s playbook,” and surveillance 
crept into the country.46 In 1956, for example, FBI Director J. Edgar 
Hoover infamously created the FBI’s Counter Intelligence Program 
(“COINTELPRO”), which tracked “radical” and “subversive” groups 
that it deemed dangerous and a threat to national security.47 This
notably included the Black Panthers, labor organizations, and antiwar 
activists.48 The NSA also got involved in the program, “tapping the
phones of an esteemed list of Vietnam War critics, among them 
42. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment was the
founding generation’s response to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the 
colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search
for evidence of criminal activity.”); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 82, Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2017) (No. 16-402) (“You know, John Adams said one of the
reasons for the war was the use by the government of third parties to obtain information [by]
forc[ing] them to help as their snitches and snoops.” (statement of Gorsuch, J.)).
 43. David Snyder, The NSA’s “General Warrants”: How the Founding Fathers Fought an
18th Century Version of the President’s Illegal Domestic Spying, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/generalwarrantsmemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/32AN-BPYP].
 44. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (recognizing the Fourth Amendment as “the founding 
generation’s response” to surveillance by British officers); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 
(1980) (“It is familiar history that indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the 
authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption
of the Fourth Amendment.”).
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
 46. Snyder, supra note 43 (comparing American surveillance to surveillance under King
George).  
47. Noa Yachot, History Shows Activists Should Fear the Surveillance State, ACLU (Oct. 27,
2017, 3:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/privacy-and-surveillance/history-
shows-activists-should-fear-surveillance [https://perma.cc/2JMY-RLMZ].
 48. Id.
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 205
journalists, sitting senators, Muhammad Ali, and Jane Fonda.”49 And
perhaps most notoriously, COINTELPRO also surveilled Martin 
Luther King, Jr. as part of a larger effort to “[p]revent the rise of a 
‘messiah’ who could unify and electrify the militant Black Nationalist 
movement.”50 
In the modern era, surveillance has widely proliferated, with fear 
serving as its fire and technology its gasoline. The United States has 
monitored everything from suspicious foreign activity51 to seemingly
harmless domestic conduct.52 In fact, after years of surveillance, the 
U.S. government has already acquired a substantial amount of 
information, making it so that even if a sitting president “never directs 
the NSA to gather one additional record, or asks the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation to initiate one more investigation . . . the U.S. 
government is sitting on top of a treasure trove of data.”53 The
surveillance of protesters in particular has grown in the last decade 
primarily for two reasons: first, technological innovation has made it 
easier to track protesters, and second, the government has increasingly 
justified surveillance as a national security issue in a post-9/11 America.
First, the sheer growth of technology allows officers to track vast 
quantities of information about protesters, making surveillance 
seamless. Social media, in particular, plays a direct role in this 
surveillance54 because social media accounts can access an individual’s 
49. Id.
 50. See Jeffery Robinson, Memphis Police Surveillance of Activists is a Betrayal and a 
Reminder, ACLU (Aug. 9, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/ 
reforming-police-practices/memphis-police-surveillance-activists-betrayal [https://perma.cc/ 
XX7X-MNEW] (quoting Memorandum from the Director of the FBI to SAC, Albany (Mar. 3,
1968), https://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro/cointel-pro-black-extremists/cointelpro-black-extremists-
part-01-of/view [https://perma.cc/QW3P-A4VV]) (alteration in original).
51. For example, in 2012, the government backed EMBERS, a $22 million program, to track 
protesters abroad. Leah McGrath Goodman, The EMBERS Project Can Predict the Future with
Twitter, NEWSWEEK MAG. (Mar. 7, 2015, 12:15 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/ 
2015/03/20/embers-project-can-predict-future-twitter-312063.html [https://perma.cc/W8CR-
Q4CL]. EMBERS used open-source information from social media to “give the U.S. a heads up” 
when protests might occur in over twenty countries across Latin America and the Middle East.
Id.
 52. See Pierce, supra note 23 (describing a CIA-backed firm’s sale of high school students’ 
social media information to local police).
 53. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Trump’s All-Too-Powerful Surveillance Infrastructure, AM.
PROSPECT (Mar. 1, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/trump’s-all-too-powerful-surveillance-
infrastructure [https://perma.cc/8FN9-KWPQ]. 
54. See Levinson-Waldman, supra note 1, at 526–31 (detailing various accounts of police
departments using social media to monitor individuals); see, e.g., Iqra Asghar, Boston Police Used
Social Media Surveillance for Years Without Informing City Council, ACLU (Feb. 8, 2018, 12:45
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206 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
location,55 which new technologies might be able to gather and 
analyze.56 For example, in 2017 and 2018, the federal government was 
granted two patents that endow it with the ability to use social media-
enabled technology to predict when the next protest will occur.57 And 
that technological capacity has trickled down to local governments as
well. Take, for instance, the Fresno Police Department, which uses 
social media-monitoring software to track “threats to public safety” by
tracing certain hashtags, including #BlackLivesMatter, #DontShoot, 
#ImUnarmed, #PoliceBrutality, and #ItsTimeforChange.58 
As another example of technological growth, the Illinois 
legislature introduced a bill in 2018 that would allow cities, like 
Chicago, to monitor protesters through drones equipped with facial-
recognition software.59 The facial-recognition software used by these 
drones could one day be produced by tech giants like Amazon, which 
is currently pitching its facial-recognition system—aptly named
“Rekognition”60—to Immigration and Customs Enforcement.61 
PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/boston-police-used-social-
media-surveillance-years-without [https://perma.cc/259X-MXF4] (discussing the Boston Police 
Department’s request for $1.4 million for a new social media surveillance system).
 55. See, e.g., Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy 
[https://perma.cc/9WWT-GKUG] (“We use location-related information—such as your current
location, where you live, the places you like to go, and the businesses and people you’re
near . . . . Location-related information can be based on things like precise device location (if 
you’ve allowed us to collect it) . . . .”).
 56. George Joseph, How Police Are Watching You on Social Media, CITYLAB (Dec. 14, 
2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/12/how-police-are-watching-on-social-media/508991 
[https://perma.cc/6N2N-N6XG] (discussing how police are working with companies such as
Geofeedia to “geolocate users” through social media). 
57. U.S. Patent No. 9,892,168 B1 (filed May 24, 2016) (patenting the “tracking and 
prediction of societal event trends using amplified signals extracted from social media”); U.S.
Patent No. 9,794,358 B1 (filed Mar. 13, 2014) (patenting technology that “infer[s] the location of 
users in online social media platforms using social network analysis”). 
58. Nicole Ozer, Police Use of Social Media Surveillance Software Is Escalating, and Activists
Are in the Digital Crosshairs, MEDIUM (Sept. 22, 2016), https://medium.com/@ACLU_NorCal/ 
police-use-of-social-media-surveillance-software-is-escalating-and-activists-are-in-the-digital-
d29d8f89c48 [https://perma.cc/FXS2-3K28].
59.  S.B. 2562, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2018).
 60. See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Amazon Is Selling Facial Recognition to Law Enforcement - For
a Fistful of Dollars, CHI. TRIB. (May 22, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
business/ct-biz-amazon-facial-recognition-program-20180522-story.html [https://perma.cc/5BSQ-
L24U] (discussing Amazon’s sale of Rekognition “to law enforcement agencies in Oregon and
Orlando”).
 61. Drew Harwell, Amazon Met with ICE Officials over Facial-Recognition System That
Could Identify Immigrants, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
technology/2018/10/23/amazon-met-with-ice-officials-over-facial-recognition-system-that-could-
identify-immigrants/?utm_term=.2e1a8340f761 [https://perma.cc/T5VW-W87F].
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 207
Although the expansion of technology has made it easier for law 
enforcement to monitor protesters, it also poses its own set of 
problems, particularly because technology can be wildly inaccurate. In 
the case of Amazon’s Rekognition, the ACLU Foundation of Northern 
California tested the program and found that the technology matched
twenty-eight members of Congress with random mugshots.62 
Second, the surveillance of protesters has grown as a direct 
response to the expansion of the national security state.63 In the 
aftermath of 9/11, local law enforcement, in particular, became heavily
integrated with counterterrorism efforts.64 This integration occurred 
since “[l]ocal police are often believed to be better suited to perform 
certain counterterrorism functions because of their superior familiarity 
with their local communities and their rich networks of relations with 
other local governmental and nongovernmental actors.”65 Given the
strategic importance of local officers on the counterterrorism front, the 
federal government “often in the name of combatting terrorism, 
funnels billions of dollars to local law enforcement agencies that can
then be used to purchase surveillance equipment.”66 But as this
surveillance network broadened after 9/11, its range of targets 
narrowed, disproportionately impacting minorities.67 
62. Amazon Facial Surveillance Technology Falsely Identifies 28 Members of Congress with
Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/news/amazon-facial-surveillance-
technology-falsely-identifies-28-members-congress-mugshots [https://perma.cc/CBQ8-T7RF].
63. For a general discussion of the national security state, see Andreas Busch, The Changing
Architecture of the National Security State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF TRANSFORMATIONS
OF THE STATE (Stephan Leibfried et al. eds., 2015).
 64. See Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN.
L. REV. 289, 303 (2012) (“After 9/11, consensus emerged across levels of government that
preventing and investigating terrorism threats would require mobilizing and linking local
governments.”).
 65. Id. at 304.
 66. Crump, supra note 40, at 1595. 
67. For example, in 2017, the FBI designated a new terror threat: “Black Identity
Extremists.” Jana Winter & Sharon Weinberger, The FBI’s New U.S. Terrorist Threat: ‘Black
Identity Extremists,’  FOREIGN POL’Y (Oct. 6, 2017, 11:42 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/ 
10/06/the-fbi-has-identified-a-new-domestic-terrorist-threat-and-its-black-identity-extremists 
[https://perma.cc/JG7S-KS4W]. Given its racially charged nature, that designation has received
its share of criticism, particularly from the Congressional Black Caucus, which held hearings on
the designation in May 2018. Press Release, Office of Rep. Terri Sewell, CBC Holds Briefing on
FBI “Black Identity Extremist” Designation (Mar. 20, 2018), https://sewell.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/cbc-holds-briefing-fbi-black-identity-extremist-designation
[https://perma.cc/6AKN-85V4].
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SURVEILLING PROTESTERS
In July 2018, during the City of Memphis lawsuit, Memphis took
an unexpected step: it unsealed all of its previously sealed court 
documents.68 Noting the importance of transparency, the City prefaced 
its release with this message, “No one’s Constitutional rights have been 
violated.”69 But were they right? The goal of this Part is to underscore
the difficulty of answering that question. To be clear, this Note’s 
argument—the one fully developed in Part IV—does not rest on
constitutional law, but this background is necessary. After all, if the 
Constitution does protect protesters, no legislation would be needed.
Because constitutional ambiguity justifies the need for legislation, this 
Part will briefly walk through that ambiguity, step by step, by looking 
at the constitutional questions a court might consider when faced with 
a case involving the surveillance of protesters.  
Step 1: What is the right at issue?
The analysis begins by pinpointing which constitutional rights are 
at issue. Courts typically analyze surveillance under the Fourth 
Amendment by treating it as a search that is subject to a 
reasonableness requirement,70 even if the surveillance also intrudes on 
First Amendment–protected activities.71 This occurs, in part, because
the First Amendment’s protections are broader than the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment.72 And intuitively, surveillance—particularly
68. City Unseals Documents in Ongoing Lawsuit, CITY OF MEMPHIS (July 24, 2018),
https://www.memphistn.gov/news/what_s_new/city_unseals_documents_in_ongoing_lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/9DBN-LC55].
 69. Id.
 70. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (analyzing electronic
surveillance as a Fourth Amendment concern).  
71. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978) (“Where the materials sought to
be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment
must be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude.’” (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485
(1965))); United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 750 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The First Amendment did
not create a legitimate expectation of privacy going beyond that afforded by the Fourth
Amendment.”).
 72. See, e.g., Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 794 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[W]hen first amendment
freedoms are involved, the first amendment may justify greater protection than mere compliance
with the fourth amendment.”); see also Kelsey Cora Skaggs, Note, Surveilling Speech and
Association: NSA Surveillance Programs and the First Amendment, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1479,
1487 (2016) (“First Amendment claims are unlike Fourth Amendment claims in that the former
are not weakened by disclosure to a third party. The protections of the First Amendment are
therefore different from, and in some ways broader than, the protections of the Fourth
Amendment.” (footnote omitted)). 
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 209
as it relates to protesters—often involves First Amendment–protected 
activity. 
Because the Fourth Amendment is narrower than the First 
Amendment, it is not always necessary for a court to analyze the two 
amendments individually. A court could conduct its analysis by looking 
only to the more proximate violation—in the case of protester 
surveillance, the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, understanding the 
First Amendment’s legal framework is still crucial because, for the sake 
of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, courts 
“examine what is ‘unreasonable’ in the light of the values of freedom 
of expression.”73 Thus, the right at issue is a Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable searches paired with a First Amendment 
value to freely speak and associate. And each can be analyzed to 
determine the extent of constitutional protection. 
Step 2: Does surveillance violate the Fourth Amendment? 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”74 This text raises two 
requirements, which must be met for there to be a Fourth Amendment 
violation: (1) there must be a search, and (2) that search must be
unreasonable.  
In its original interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court explained that a search occurs when the government 
intrudes on a “constitutionally protected area,” such as one’s home.75 
But in Katz v. United States,76 the Court expanded that interpretation.77 
It held that a Fourth Amendment right exists beyond “constitutionally
protected areas”—it exists wherever there is a “reasonable expectation 
of privacy.”78 Katz then explained that a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy—and thereby no Fourth Amendment 
73.  Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973).
74.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
75. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–11 (1961) (“At the very core [of the
Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home . . . .”).
76.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
 77. See id. at 351 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”).
 78. Id. at n.9 (“It is true that this Court has occasionally described its conclusions in terms
of ‘constitutionally protected areas,’ but we have never suggested that this concept can serve as a
talismanic solution to every Fourth Amendment problem.” (citations omitted)). 
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210 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
protection—to information she “knowingly exposes to the public.”79 
This poses a problem for protesters in particular. A protest is 
inherently public. In fact, “[i]t is almost a truism that social movements 
and protest[s] rely heavily on publicity and visibility to call attention to 
marginal groups and claims or unmet social problems.”80 
Even if protesters can get through the “reasonable expectation of
privacy” prong of Fourth Amendment analysis, another hurdle awaits: 
the search must be unreasonable. To that end, courts consider whether 
government surveillance relates to “a legitimate law enforcement 
purpose,” as part of their Fourth Amendment analysis.81 
Unfortunately, this too poses a problem for protesters because
protests, even when peaceful, are frequently perceived as having the 
potential for violence.82 The Memphis Police Director, Michael 
Rallings, echoed this sentiment, noting, “[m]onitoring these public 
social media posts is simply good police work . . . keeping everyone
safe without violence.”83 These public safety concerns make it difficult 
to find a Fourth Amendment violation because the surveillance 
purports to assist law enforcement.
Step 3: Does surveillance violate the First Amendment? 
The First Amendment protects “the freedom of speech” and “the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”84 A violation of this 
Amendment occurs not only where the government forbids protected 
79. Id. at 351–52 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home 
or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as
private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” (citations
omitted)). 
80. Peter Ullrich & Philipp Knopp, Protesters’ Reactions to Video Surveillance of 
Demonstrations: Counter-Moves, Security Cultures, and the Spiral of Surveillance and Counter-
Surveillance, 16 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 183, 192 n.17 (2018).
81. United States v. Mayer, 503 F.3d 740, 753 (9th Cir. 2007); accord All. to End Repression
v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the First Amendment permits
the use of undercover officers “unless the motives of the police are improper or the methods
forbidden by the Fourth Amendment”).  
82. For example, in City of Memphis, the City pointed to multiple legitimate threats that it
argues surveillance helped it prevent, including a potential Ku Klux Klan appearance at a Black
Lives Matter protest, a hacking threat to the Memphis Zoo computer system, and a threat to
ambush Shelby County law enforcement. City Unseals Documents in Ongoing Lawsuit, supra note 
68.
 83. Id. (quoting Memphis Police Director Michael W. Rallings). 
84.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 211
activity, but also where the government deters it.85 In the latter case,
the government is said to have created a “chilling effect.”86 As Justice
Warren explained, “[T]he fear of the censor by the composer of ideas
acts as a substantial deterrent to the creation of new thoughts.”87 
When it comes to associational freedoms, the Supreme Court has 
supported a prohibition on chilling First Amendment rights in cases 
like NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.88 In Patterson, the Court 
struck down an Alabama law requiring the disclosure of the NAACP’s
membership lists, explaining that privacy “may . . . be indispensable to
preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
espouses dissident beliefs.”89 
But on the other end of the spectrum lies Laird v. Tatum,90 the
leading case on whether the surveillance of protesters violates the First
Amendment. There, the government surveilled Vietnam War 
protesters by tracking who attended and spoke at meetings and 
reporting that information to the Army Intelligence Headquarters.91 
The Supreme Court held that there was not a justiciable controversy 
because this surveillance did not sufficiently chill the protesters from 
exercising their First Amendment rights.92 The Laird Court explained 
that an actionable chilling effect cannot arise “merely from the 
individual’s knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in 
certain activities or from the individual’s concomitant fear that, armed 
with the fruits of those activities, the agency might in the future take 
some other and additional action detrimental to that individual.”93 
Laird thereby instructs that mere surveillance does not chill speech or 
assembly; the First Amendment requires something more.  
85. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (“In recent years this Court has found in a 
number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of
governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.”).
 86. Id.
87.  Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 75 (1961) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
88.  NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
 89. Id. at 462 (emphasis added); accord Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372
U.S. 539, 557 (1963) (“[A]n adequate foundation for inquiry must be laid before proceeding in
such a manner as will substantially intrude upon and severely curtail or inhibit constitutionally
protected activities or seriously interfere with similarly protected associational rights.”).
90.  Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
 91. Id. at 6.
 92. Id. at 3 (reversing the lower appellate court’s finding of a justiciable controversy in the
protesters’ complaint of a “chilling effect” on the exercise of their First Amendment rights).
 93. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted). 
BARA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2019 11:12 PM        
   
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
   
    
   
   
 
  
     
  
  
 
 
  
   
 
  
 
    
 
     
  
       
  
212 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
But what is something more? Some principles have emerged to 
deal with this issue. For example, the widely accepted standard for 
determining a chilling effect is whether a reasonable person would be 
deterred.94 Courts also examine a person’s conduct to determine
whether First Amendment activity has been chilled because when “a 
party can show no change in his behavior, he has quite plainly shown
no chilling of his First Amendment right to free speech.”95 This analysis 
is especially tricky in the context of protests. The surveillance of 
protesters can certainly function as a prior restraint and stop 
individuals from protesting before the fact.96 But others will continue 
protesting anyway.97 The existence of a chilling effect and subsequent
First Amendment violation in this context can therefore be difficult to 
find. These ambiguities demonstrate the obstacles protesters face when 
making constitutional arguments, highlighting the need for a legislative 
solution. 
III. THE MEMPHIS CONSENT DECREE
When the extent of the NSA surveillance program was first
revealed by Edward Snowden in 2013, it surprised many Americans.98 
But for the people of Memphis, surveillance generally—and the 
surveillance of political dissidents particularly—is nothing new.99 It is a
94. Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 118 (D.D.C. 2005).
95.  Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001). 
96. Vohra, supra note 17 (“Surveillance is what chills people from mobilising and
organising.” (quoting Omar Farah, the lead attorney at the Center for Constitutional Rights)); 
see also Telephone Interview with Paul Garner, Original Named Plaintiff in City of Memphis (Oct.
26, 2018) [hereinafter Garner Interview] (on file with author).
 97. See Lauren C. Williams, Police Surveillance of Black Protesters Won’t Stop the
Movement, THINKPROGRESS (Oct. 14, 2016, 2:12 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/surveillance-
wont-stop-black-activists-9008acb3944b [https://perma.cc/YF35-TDGG] (“‘A lot of people are 
really freaked out about it, or whatever, but I can’t live my life like that,’ she said nonchalantly. ‘I
still live my life the way that I was. It’s not changing anything.’” (quoting Black Lives Matter
protester Johnetta “Netta” Elzie)).
 98. See David Rieff, Why Nobody Cares About the Surveillance State, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 
22, 2013, 11:30 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/22/why-nobody-cares-about-the-
surveillance-state [https://perma.cc/4BBA-CYGQ] (“[I]t turned out that the ‘secret’ he revealed
appeared to be one of the most broadly shared secrets in the world. The White House knew,
members of the Senate and House intelligence committees knew, and major U.S. allies
[knew] . . . . The only group that did not know . . . was the general public.”).
 99. See Robinson, supra note 50 (“A lawsuit by the ACLU of Tennessee recently
produced evidence that Memphis police spied on Black activists. As Yogi Berra said, ‘It’s like 
déjà vu all over again.’ This is the same city where five decades ago the police spied on Martin
Luther King, Jr.”).
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 213
product of Memphis’s history—a history that eventually produced the
Memphis Consent Decree. 
Their story begins in 1965. That year, MPD created its new 
investigative arm, the Domestic Intelligence Unit (“DIU”).100 The DIU 
secretly maintained files on Memphis citizens engaged in “politically 
controversial” activities, even when that activity was not criminal.101 
Between 1965 and 1976, Memphis expanded the DIU’s budget,102 and 
with that, the DIU expanded its scope of targets, actively surveilling 
“individuals and organizations engaged in ‘Civil Rights, Union, and 
Negro Coalition activities.’”103 For example, on April 3, 1968, when 
Martin Luther King, Jr. arrived in Memphis “with one more day to 
live,” MPD stationed officers at the Memphis Airport to track his 
activities.104 MPD justified the surveillance by framing it as necessary,
“not only because Dr. King was a controversial public figure, but also
because he had been meeting with local Black militants while in
Memphis on prior visits.”105 
In addition to civil rights activists, MPD monitored Vietnam War 
protesters.106 One of the protesters that MPD tracked was Memphis 
State University student and member of Vietnam Veterans Against the 
War, Eric Carter.107 In 1976, years after graduating, Carter discovered 
that his college roommate was an undercover MPD officer who tracked 
Carter’s activity, specifically his attendance and activism in antiwar 
protests.108 Carter requested the file MPD kept on him, which “was the 
100. Blacklisted: Memphis Police Surveillance and Kendrick v. Chandler—A Timeline, 
ACLU-TN (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.aclu-tn.org/blacklisted-memphis-police-surveillance-and-
kendrick-v-chandler-a-timeline [https://perma.cc/LNZ3-TDBG] [hereinafter ACLU Timeline].
 101. Id.
102. The DIU budget was expanded to $1 million in 1976, which is the equivalent of nearly
$4,270,000 today. Id. 
103. Id. These organizations included the “ACLU, NAACP, the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference, City of Memphis Hospital workers, Memphis State University Black
Students’ Organization, Memphis Public Schools principals and teachers, and the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).” Id.
104. Robinson, supra note 50. 
105. Id.
 106. Joseph Weiler, Police Order Burning of File on Vietnam War Protester, COM. APPEAL
(Sept. 8, 1976), http://www.aclu-tn.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Kendrick-Documents-Police-
Order-Burning-of-File-On-Vietnam-War-Protester-Commercial-Appeal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XVQ9-TQXZ] (describing how protester Eric Carter had been monitored by
an undercover cop who pretended to be Carter’s friend for years and created an extensive
personal file on Carter, including personal photos).
 107. Id.
 108. Id.; Robinson, supra note 50.
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214 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
first [request] ever received by the department since it began keeping 
domestic intelligence files in about 1965.”109 
Beyond merely denying the request, MPD “doused with fuel and 
burned” ten file cabinets containing domestic surveillance records.110 
One police chief described the destruction to a Memphis newspaper in 
1976 as a “purge.”111 The ACLU intervened, receiving a federal court 
order on September 10, 1976, to prevent the destruction of more 
files.112 “[B]ut before the order could be served,”113 Memphis Mayor 
Wyeth Chandler directed the destruction of the remaining files “by 
noon.”114 Mayor Chandler then disbanded the DIU.115 The extent of 
MPD’s surveillance soon emerged: “[T]he department had been spying 
on numerous people and organizations for years, probing their political 
activities and private lives.”116 
On September 14, 1976, the ACLU of Tennessee (“ACLU-TN”) 
filed a class action suit in the District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee against Mayor Chandler and various high-ranking officials 
in MPD.117 The complaint in that case—Kendrick v. Chandler118— 
alleged that the City had violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments.119 
But the court never reached the constitutional issues. Instead, on 
September 14, 1978—exactly two years after the filing of the
complaint—the parties essentially settled.120 The plaintiffs and the City
agreed to a Consent Decree121 to prevent MPD from surveilling citizens
109. Weiler, supra note 106. 
110. Leta McCollough Seletzky, Opinion, The Memphis Police Spied on Activists, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/opinion/the-memphis-police-spied-on-
activists.html [https://perma.cc/W48C-Q5VC].  
111. Weiler, supra note 106 (quoting Memphis police chief W.O. Crumby).
112.  ACLU Timeline, supra note 100. 
113.  McCollough Seletzky, supra note 110.
114.  ACLU Timeline, supra note 100. 
115.  McCollough Seletzky, supra note 110.
 116. Id.
117.  Complaint at 1, Kendrick v. Chandler, No. C76-449 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 1976).
118.  Kendrick v. Chandler, No. 76-449 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 1978).
119. Complaint at 1, Kendrick v. Chandler, No. C76-449. The plaintiffs brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which allows for the recovery of monetary damages for certain constitutional
violations committed by state and local officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
120. Order, Judgment and Decree at 1, Kendrick v. Chandler, No. C76-449 (W.D. Tenn. Sept.
14, 1978) [hereinafter Consent Decree].  
121. The Consent Decree is split up into thirteen subparts. Id. at 2–6. For reference, here is a 
summary of the Decree’s subparts:  
(A) A statement of the general principles of the Decree
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 215
who were engaged in First Amendment–protected activities.122 The
Decree accomplished this by prohibiting the City from conducting 
“political intelligence,” defined as “the gathering, indexing, filing, 
maintenance, storage or dissemination of information, or any other 
investigative activity, relating to any person’s beliefs, opinions,
associations or other exercise of First Amendment rights.”123 More 
specifically, the City was barred from: 
engag[ing] in any action for the purpose of, or reasonably having the
effect of, deterring any person from exercising First Amendment
rights. As an example, the City of Memphis shall not, at any lawful
meeting or demonstration, for the purpose of chilling the exercise of 
First Amendment rights or for the purpose of maintaining a record, 
record the name of or photograph any person in attendance . . . .124 
Several aspects of the Memphis Decree are crucial to this Note. 
The Decree begins with a broad prohibition: “the City of Memphis 
shall not engage in political intelligence.”125 From that broad 
prohibition, the Decree establishes more specific restrictions.
Importantly, the City may not operate an office for the purpose of
political intelligence.126 It may not “intercept, record, transcribe or 
otherwise interfere with any communication by means of electronic 
(B) Definitions
(C) The general prohibition against the collection of political intelligence or the maintenance 
of any office for this collection
(D) A prohibition against electronic surveillance for political intelligence  
(E) A prohibition against covert surveillance for political intelligence
(F) A prohibition against harassment and intimidation for individuals exercising First 
Amendment rights 
(G) An exception for criminal investigations that may interfere with the exercise of First 
Amendment rights and procedural guidelines for this exception
(H) A prohibition on the maintenance and dissemination of information
(I) A restriction on joint operations between Memphis and “any local, state, federal or 
private agency, or any person” 
(J) The requirement to disseminate and post the Decree 
(K) Effective date 
(L) Binding effect 
(M)Retention of jurisdiction
Id. 
122. Id. at 2 (subpart (A)).  
123. Id. at 2, 3 (subparts (B)(4) and (C)(1)). 
124. Id. at 3–4 (subpart (F)(2)).
 125. Id. at 3 (subpart (C)(1)). 
126. Id. (subpart (C)(2)). 
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216 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
surveillance for the purpose of political intelligence.”127 And the City
may not harass or intimidate “person[s] exercising First Amendment 
rights.”128 
But the Decree is not absolute in its prohibition of surveillance. It
contains one key exemption: under certain circumstances, officers 
investigating criminal conduct may continue with an investigation even 
though it might interfere with First Amendment rights.129 The officer 
must first report the investigation to the Memphis Director of Police 
for review.130 Then, the Director must make four findings: (1) that the 
investigation does not violate the Decree; (2) that the interference with 
First Amendment rights is “unavoidably necessary”; (3) that “[e]very 
reasonable precaution has been employed” to reduce the intrusion; 
and (4) that “the investigation employs the least intrusive technique 
necessary” for gathering the information.131 If the Director can make
these findings, then she can provide a written authorization allowing 
the investigation to proceed.132 The district court retained jurisdiction
of the case so that it may enforce the Consent Decree, if necessary, in 
the future.133 
Thirty-nine years later—in City of Memphis—the district court’s 
enforcement became necessary. In violation of the Consent Decree, 
Memphis had continued to surveil its citizens, “pairing old methods 
with 21st century technology.”134 Paul Garner, one of the original 
named plaintiffs in City of Memphis,135 explained that MPD regularly 
maintained documents on protesters, and—in his view—that was 
especially true for protesters who were critical of the police 
department.136 MPD also converted these records into PowerPoint
127. Id. (subpart (D)). 
128. Id. (subpart (F)(1)). 
129. Id. at 4 (subpart (G)). 
130. Id. (subpart (G)(1)). 
131. Id. at 4–5 (subpart (G)(2)).
 132. Id. at 4 (subpart (G)(2)). 
133. Id. at 6 (subpart (M)). 
134.  McCollough Seletzky, supra note 110.
135. Garner was dismissed from the suit along with Elaine Blanchard, Keedran Franklin, and
Bradley Watkins because they lacked standing. This issue is explained more fully in Part IV. 
136. Garner Interview, supra note 96; see also Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-
02120-JPM-egb (W.D. Tenn. July 24, 2018) [hereinafter “Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment
Memorandum”] (“Dir. Rallings also instructed OHS to create and maintain a database of
protests, demonstrations, and flash mobs.”). Garner recalls that when individuals attended a City
Hall meeting to support the reinstatement of the Civilian Law Enforcement Review Board in
Memphis, MPD added them to a “blacklist.” Garner Interview, supra note 96.
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 217
presentations, featuring the pictures and names of people who had
attended protests.137 Garner alleges that MPD then distributed these 
PowerPoints to the Mayor and employers in Memphis.138 
In another example, an MPD officer created and operated a fake 
Facebook account.139 For three years, Detective Tim Reynolds 
maintained the account under the name “Bob Smith,” where he talked
to local activists, kept track of upcoming protests, and pretended to 
support their causes.140 Finally, MPD operated OHS—an office
primarily dedicated to surveilling protesters, tracking trends in their
protest behavior, and providing MPD with a “heads up” on upcoming
protests.141 
The district court found in favor of the City’s protesters.142 It held 
that the City of Memphis violated the Consent Decree by engaging in 
specifically prohibited conduct.143 In addition to gathering, filing, and
disseminating information on protesters, “[t]he City’s other violations 
are traceable to the City’s failure to police itself.”144 The Consent 
Decree required that the City familiarize its officers with the contents 
137. See Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Memorandum, supra note 136, at 9–10 (discussing the 
PowerPoint presentations). 
138.  Garner Interview, supra note 96.
 139. Jon Schuppe, Undercover Cops Break Facebook Rules to Track Protesters, Ensnare
Criminals, NBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2018, 6:08 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/ 
undercover-cops-break-facebook-rules-track-protesters-ensnare-criminals-n916796 
[https://perma.cc/H3TZ-RQ66].  
140. Id.
 141. Garner Interview, supra note 96; see also ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 
No. 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb, slip op. at 22 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2018) (“The evidence clearly and 
convincingly shows that the Office of Homeland Security (‘OHS’) was operated for the purpose 
of political intelligence.”).
 142. City of Memphis, slip op. at 2.
 143. Id. The Court found that the City violated the Decree by conducting seven types of 
activities:
1. Gathering and indexing information related to lawful protests;
2. Operating an office for the purpose of political intelligence;
3. Using a fake social media account to monitor protesters;
4. Failing to familiarize officers with the content of the Consent Decree;
5. Failing to review lawful investigations of criminal conduct that could result in the 
gathering of political intelligence before conducting the investigation;
6. Providing information related to First Amendment rights to individuals unaffiliated with
law enforcement; and
7. Recording the identities of protest attendees to maintain a record of these individuals.
Id. at 21–30.
 144. Id. at 26. 
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218 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
of the Decree.145 But the court found that MPD officers misunderstood
the meaning of “political intelligence.”146 Although these officers 
believed political intelligence required a partisan purpose, “the
Consent Decree forbids any investigation into the lawful exercise of 
First Amendment rights; [and] bipartisan or nonpartisan political 
intelligence is still political intelligence.”147 Moreover, the City only 
included a few references to the Decree in its voluminous training 
manuals.148 When the City did mention the Decree, it failed to define
“political intelligence.”149 As a result, the officers that testified in City 
of Memphis only had a general knowledge of the Decree and its 
requirements.150 
After finding that the City had violated the Decree,151 the court 
proceeded to sanction the City for its conduct.152 The court issued the
following orders: (1) the City must revise departmental regulations to 
define political intelligence;153 (2) the City must create a training
program for MPD and its affiliates, the OHS and MPD’s Real Time
Crime Center, to explain political intelligence;154 (3) the City must
create “a process for the approval of investigations into unlawful 
conduct that may incidentally result in political intelligence”;155 (4) the 
City must create guidelines for the use of social media searches by 
officers;156 and (5) the City must keep a list of all social media search 
terms used by MPD and submit this list to the court every three months 
145.  Consent Decree, supra note 120, at 5–6 (subpart (J)). 
146. City of Memphis, slip op. at 32. 
147. Id.
 148. Id. at 26. 
149. Id. at 27. 
150. See id. at 26 (citing Director Rallings’s testimony that he had only general knowledge of
the Consent Decree). 
151. Although the court found that the City of Memphis violated the Consent Decree in each
of the seven ways listed above, the plaintiffs had alleged nine violations of the Decree. Id. at 21– 
31. The plaintiffs, thus, could not prove that the City had violated the Decree by harassing anyone.
Id. at 30–31. The plaintiffs also failed to prove that the City had disseminated information for the
purpose of political intelligence. Id. at 31.  
152. Id. at 31–35. 
153. Id. at 33. 
154. Id.
 155. Id. at 34. The court noted that this may require an amendment to the Consent Decree.
Id.
 156. Id.
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 219
until the court decides it no longer must do so.157 The court instructed
the City to comply with each of these orders by January 14, 2019.158 
Finally, the court addressed a logistical issue: “It may be
impossible for the Court to provide legal guidance on every situation 
that MPD will face that may implicate the Consent Decree.”159 To deal 
with this issue, the court decided to appoint an independent monitor 
who would ensure compliance with the Decree.160 The monitor’s job is 
to supervise the implementation of the court’s sanctions.161 The court 
ordered each party to submit proposals for an independent monitor by 
December 10, 2018.162 
IV. LESSONS BEYOND MEMPHIS
Though not explicitly mentioned in either the First or Fourth 
Amendments, the concept of privacy sits at the heart of both.163 This
means that even if the surveillance of protesters does not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation, protecting protesters from
surveillance falls right alongside the principles the Constitution
codified, and the Constitution “does not prevent or advise against
legislative or executive efforts to establish non-constitutional 
protections against possible abuses.”164 In light of the widespread
surveillance of protesters discussed in Part I and the constitutional
limitations discussed in Part II, this Part proposes a solution built on
the Memphis Decree from Part III. Section (A) discusses its form, (B)
its substance, and (C) its implementation. 
A. Form
The best method to effectuate the principles of the First and 
Fourth Amendments is through legislation that limits the surveillance 
of protesters by law enforcement. But an obvious question lingers: If 
157. Id. at 35.  
158. Id. at 33–35.
 159. Id. at 35.  
160. Id.
 161. Id.
 162. Id.
 163. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
198 (1890) (“The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to
what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others. . . . [A]nd
even if he has chosen to give them expression, he generally retains the power to fix the limits of
the[ir] publicity . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
164.  Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567 (1978). 
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220 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
the Memphis Consent Decree worked so well, why look to legislation
at all? To frame the question differently, why are consent decrees not 
enough? Compared to legislation, there are several reasons why a 
consent decree would not be the best option to protect First and Fourth
Amendment values moving forward.  
First, consent decrees present standing issues that do not exist with
legislation.165 A consent decree is similar to a contract, only binding the
parties that originally entered into the decree.166 So when someone sues 
to enforce a consent decree, the injury they have faced is essentially
breach of contract.167 Because of that, an individual who was not part 
of the original “contract” cannot claim an injury.168 Even parties that 
“were intended to be benefited by” the consent decree cannot launch
proceedings to enforce it.169 
As it turns out, standing posed a significant problem in City of 
Memphis, where the individually named protesters eventually had to
be dropped from the lawsuit because they lacked standing.170 The only 
named plaintiff in Kendrick—the original litigation resulting in the 
Consent Decree—was the ACLU-TN; Kendrick did not include any of 
the plaintiffs named in the City of Memphis case.171 So only the ACLU-
165. A court does not have jurisdiction over cases or controversies when the plaintiff lacks
standing to sue. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). Three requirements
must be met for a plaintiff to have standing:
(1)The plaintiff must have sustained an “‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected 
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not 
“conjectural” or “hypothetical.”’”  
(2)There must be a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct.
(3)It must be likely that the injury can be redressed.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting 
Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155).
 166. See Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519 (1986)
(“To be sure, consent decrees bear some of the earmarks of judgments entered after litigation. 
At the same time, because their terms are arrived at through mutual agreement of the parties,
consent decrees also closely resemble contracts.”).
 167. See Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983) (“A consent decree has 
attributes of both a contract and of a judicial act.”).
168. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750 (1975) (“The Court of 
Appeals recognized, and respondent concedes here, that a well-settled line of authority from this
Court establishes that a consent decree is not enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by
those who are not parties to it . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
169. Id.
 170. See Order Denying the City’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Standing
at 5, ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb (W.D. Tenn. July
30, 2018) (“On June 30, 2017, the Court dismissed the Blanchard Plaintiffs from this action after
determining that they lacked standing to enforce the Consent Decree as non-parties to it.”).
 171. Id.
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 221
TN could bring suit. And even then, the ACLU-TN faced problems in 
the litigation because in Kendrick, the organization had a different 
name—the American Civil Liberties Union in West Tennessee.172 
Legislation does not pose a standing problem. Instead, it binds
everyone equally, protecting all protesters who fall within its zone of 
interest. 
Second, it is much more difficult to change a consent decree than
it is to change legislation. Though legislation is by no means simple to 
alter,173 amending legislation requires neither the consent of a court nor 
the consent of parties with structurally divergent motives. In the 
absence of litigation, a city or a police department has no incentive to
strengthen the power of a consent decree against it. And the original 
plaintiffs—here, the protesters or institutional party—have no
incentive to weaken a consent decree. But the ability to amend is
crucial. After all, surveillance methods are constantly evolving. That is 
why Memphis City Chief Legal Officer Bryce McMullen correctly 
articulated another problem with the Memphis Decree: the Decree, 
written in 1978, is old.174 As a result, the Decree’s description of
electronic surveillance in subpart (D) was not and could not have been
written in anticipation of the technology that exists today.175 
Nevertheless, the court held: 
172. ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb, slip op. at 5
(W.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2018).
 173. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1441, 1444–48 (2008) (discussing legislative “vetogates”).  
174. During the trial, the City of Memphis publicly argued that the City could no longer be
bound by the Decree because the Decree was so outdated. McMullen argued: 
[T]he City maintains the 40-year-old consent decree, which was drafted before the 
existence of the Internet, security cameras, body cameras, sky cameras, traffic light
cameras and smart phones, is woefully outdated and impractical to apply in modern
law enforcement.
Reading the consent decree literally, and applying it in today’s technological world,
would require the Police Department to turn off all security cameras and body-worn
cameras during a protest. It would prevent police from looking at publicly posted
content, and severely hamper their ability to provide public safety. We firmly believe 
the consent decree was drafted without any conscious thought of the technological
advances that exist today, and that we have substantially complied with the consent
decree in these modern times.
Statement from Bruce McMullen, CITY OF MEMPHIS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.memphistn.gov/ 
news/what_s_new/statement_from_bruce_mc_mullen [https://perma.cc/8VEB-ZPS3]. The court
specifically rejected McMullen’s argument by distinguishing between affirmative and inadvertent
acts. City of Memphis, slip op. at 17 (“[S]imply receiving or inadvertently finding information does
not [require affirmative acts].”).  
175.  Consent Decree, supra note 120, at 3 (subpart (D)). 
BARA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2019 11:12 PM        
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
   
       
  
   
  
 
222 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
While certain terms of the Consent Decree may be outdated, the 
concepts are not, and the dilemma faced by the City is not new. Every 
community must determine how much of its citizens’ privacy it is
willing to sacrifice in the name of public safety. The idea that police 
should be limited in their powers predates 2018 and 1978.176 
Even though the City of Memphis court still interpreted the 
Decree against the City, it called upon the parties to edit the Decree in 
light of this flaw and noted that it may be more difficult to do that in 
the future as technology continues to evolve.177 Legislation does not 
eliminate this second problem because, at the end of the day, statutes 
must also be updated as technology progresses. But structurally, the 
legislature—a body that is politically accountable to the public—is 
better equipped to adjust the law to new technology than are two
parties in an inherently adversarial system.  
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, consent decrees cannot be 
formed without litigation. It would be incredibly inefficient to 
effectuate change with parties bringing multiple lawsuits, hoping that 
those suits result in a decree. Legislation does not pose this problem.
One does not have to wait for a lawsuit to benefit from the protections 
of legislation. In fact, if legislation is the product of a lawsuit, it typically 
will not help that initial plaintiff either because the suit has concluded 
or, if it has not concluded, because courts generally do not apply 
statutes retroactively.178 
B. Substance 
Given that the best approach to reduce the surveillance of 
protesters in the absence of a clearer constitutional directive is 
legislation, the substance of the legislation must be considered next. A 
few cities have enacted or considered local ordinances that aim to 
protect protesters from surveillance.179 Despite the fact that these
ordinances are a step in the right direction, they fall short of the
176. City of Memphis, slip op. at 36. 
177. Id.
 178. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268 (1994) (“[S]tatutory retroactivity has
long been disfavored . . . .”).
 179. See, e.g., infra notes 180–88 and accompanying text; City of Seattle CB 119030, Sept. 1, 
2017, https://seattle.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2981172&GUID=0B2FEFC0-822F-
4907-9409-E318537E5330&FullText=1 [https://perma.cc/C785-ZQFX]; Surveillance-Technology 
and Community-Safety Ordinance, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA (July 21, 2016),
https://www.sccgov.org/sites/ceo/srtup/Pages/home.aspx [https://perma.cc/29UE-VPST].
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2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 223
protections offered by the Memphis Consent Decree, which is why
Memphis offers a better model for the substance of future legislation. 
Take, for example, an enacted ordinance in Berkeley, California
and a proposed ordinance in New York City, New York. In March
2018, the Berkeley City Council passed the Surveillance Technology 
Use and Community Safety Ordinance.180 In it, Council approval is 
required, “except in Exigent Circumstances,” before the City Manager 
does any of the following:  
a. Seek[s], solicit[s], or accept[s] grant funds for the purchase of, or
in-kind or other donations of, Surveillance Technology;
b. Acquir[es] new Surveillance Technology, including but not 
limited to procuring such technology without the exchange of
monies or consideration;
c. Us[es] new Surveillance Technology, or us[es] Surveillance 
Technology previously approved by the City Council for a 
purpose, or in a manner not previously approved by the City
Council; or 
d. Enter[s] into an agreement with a non-City entity to acquire,
share or otherwise use Surveillance Technology or the 
information it provides, or expand[s] a vendor’s permission to 
share or otherwise use Surveillance Technology or the 
information it provides.181 
This Berkeley ordinance defines “surveillance technology” as “an 
electronic device, system utilizing an electronic device, or similar 
technological tool used, designed, or primarily intended to collect 
audio, electronic, visual, location, thermal, olfactory, biometric, or 
similar information specifically associated with, or capable of being
associated with, any individual or group.”182 Exempted from this 
definition are nine categories of technology, including routine office 
hardware, municipal agency databases, security cameras, and
cybersecurity technologies.183 
Meanwhile, the New York City Council has considered the Public 
Oversight of Surveillance Technology (“POST”) Act.184 If passed, the 
180.  Berkeley, Cal., Mun. Code ch. 2.99 (2019).
 181. Id. § 2.99.030(1).
 182. Id. § 2.99.020(1).
 183. Id.
184. New York City Council Int. 0487-2018, Feb. 14, 2018, https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/ 
LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3343878&GUID=996ABB2A-9F4C-4A32-B081-D6F24AB954A0& 
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224 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
POST Act would require the New York Police Department to propose
a “surveillance technology impact and use policy,” in which it would 
describe the “capabilities of a surveillance technology” and the “rules,
processes and guidelines issued by the department regulating access to 
or use of such surveillance technology.”185 The Act then authorizes a
forty-five day public-comment period, which may be considered before 
a final policy is drafted.186 The inspector general for the police 
department monitors compliance with the policy and publishes 
recommendations relating to revisions of the policy.187 Just like the
Berkeley ordinance, the POST Act exempts certain categories of 
technology.188 
Each of these ordinances misses a key aspect of the Memphis 
Consent Decree: the general prohibition against the collection of
political intelligence.189 As a reminder, Memphis defined “political 
intelligence” as “the gathering, indexing, filing, maintenance, storage 
or dissemination of information, or any other investigative activity,
relating to any person’s beliefs, opinions, associations or other exercise
of First Amendment rights.”190 This prohibition is why the court in City 
of Memphis described MPD as having the “opportunity to become one
of the few, if only, metropolitan police departments in the country with
a robust policy for the protection of privacy in the digital age.”191 
Instead of broadly prohibiting particular uses across any type of 
technology, Berkeley and New York City created a lenient, case-by-
case inquiry, where surveillance technology may be used to gather 
political intelligence, so long as certain requirements are met.192 Under 
Options=ID%7cText%7c&Search=surveillance [https://perma.cc/VP7L-296V] (proposing to add
§ 14-175 to chapter 1, title 14 of the administrative code of New York City and § 809 to chapter
34 of the New York City charter).
 185. Id. sec. 1, § 14-175(a)–(b).
 186. Id. § 14-175(e).
 187. Id. sec. 2, § 809(b).
 188. See id. sec. 1, § 14-175(a). For more information on the POST Act, see The Public
Oversight of Surveillance Technology (POST) Act: A Resource Page, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (June 12, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/public-oversight-surveillance-
technology-post-act-resource-page [https://perma.cc/K9PT-UHE5].
 189. See Consent Decree, supra note 120, at 3 (subpart (C)(1)).
 190. Id. at 2 (subpart (B)(4)). 
191. ACLU of Tennessee, Inc. v. City of Memphis, No. 2:17-cv-02120-JPM-egb, slip op. at 38
(W.D. Tenn. Oct. 26, 2018).
192. Concerningly, the statutes only regulate “surveillance technology,” meaning technology
exempt from this category likely may be used to gather political intelligence without jumping
through the hoops that surveillance technology must jump through. See supra notes 180–88 and
accompanying text.
BARA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/16/2019 11:12 PM        
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
  
  
 
     
  
 
2019] FROM MEMPHIS, WITH LOVE 225
the POST Act, City Council approval is not even needed before 
technology may be used in this way.193 
While reasonable minds can differ as to the contents of this 
legislation and still accomplish the goal of protecting protesters, there 
are several aspects of the Memphis Decree that should be incorporated 
into antisurveillance legislation. The best aspects of the Memphis 
Decree—chosen by how effectively they preserve First and Fourth 
Amendment values—are its general prohibition against political 
intelligence, its prohibition against the creation of an office for the 
purpose of carrying out this intelligence gathering, its prohibition 
against harassment and intimidation, and its exception for criminal
proceedings. 
Successful legislation should also incorporate the balance that the 
Memphis Decree struck. The point is not to forbid the gathering of 
information; rather, it is to ensure that where the collection of 
information serves a legitimate purpose, officers go through a proper 
protocol. Consider this explanation from the court in City of Memphis: 
A police officer may, for example, need to “friend” a suspected drug
dealer on Facebook as part of an investigation. The officer in question
would not be conducting political intelligence, because while he may 
incidentally obtain information relating to the suspect’s exercise of 
First Amendment rights, he is not “gathering” that information. This
officer does, however, need to seek formal approval, because the 
investigation “may result in the collection of information about the
exercise of First Amendment rights.”194 
This balance is further served when legislation, like the Decree,
includes an action requirement. As the City of Memphis court 
explained, gathering information requires an affirmative act.195 
Because of this, “[a] police officer does not have to cover his body
camera every time he passes someone with a political t-shirt, because 
193. See Nathan Sheard, Lifting the Cloak of Secrecy from NYPD Surveillance Technology, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/lifting-cloak-
secrecy-nypd-surveillance-technology [https://perma.cc/9WNS-3XN3] (“[T]he POST Act stops
short of empowering City Council members to decide whether to approve or deny spy tech
acquisition. Nor does the POST Act provide the New York City Council with any power to order 
the NYPD to cease use of equipment . . . used in violation of the published policy.”).
 194. City of Memphis, slip op. at 34 n.14 (quoting Consent Decree, supra note 120, at 4 
(subpart (G)(1)).
 195. Id. at 17. 
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226 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:197
the information received by the camera about political activities was 
not affirmatively sought out by the officer.”196 
Finally, the Consent Decree bans the gathering of information for 
“the purpose of political intelligence,” and as the City of Memphis 
court clarified, this does not mean that “political intelligence” must be
the exclusive purpose of the surveillance.197 Legislation should similarly
incorporate “mixed motive” claims so that police departments cannot 
easily sideline the requirements of the legislation. 
C. Implementation 
With the advantages of legislation and its substance in mind, 
implementation can now be discussed more specifically. Legislation 
that protects protesters from surveillance can be implemented by three 
levels of actors: the federal legislature, state legislatures, and city 
councils. Each actor brings its own set of benefits, challenges, and 
possibilities of success. National legislation, for example, cultivates
efficiency—no need remains for fifty state legislatures or thousands of 
city councils to consider the issue when Congress already has. On the 
other hand, the policies adopted by police departments vary based on 
locality, and state and local leaders may be better equipped to legislate 
with those policies in mind because they are more familiar with them.  
These actors also differ with respect to the power to regulate 
police surveillance in the first place. For Congress, finding that grant of 
power can be a little tricky because the surveillance at issue does not 
involve regulation of the conduct of federal agencies or officers. 
Instead, the surveillance of protesters is primarily conducted by local 
police departments, which are regulated by states. This means that 
congressional regulation in this area could heavily intrude into an area 
typically left under state control.198 But there are avenues for national 
196. Id.
 197. The City of Memphis court outlined three problems related to having an exclusive
purpose before finding a violation:
[First,] MPD can nearly always be said to have more than one purpose. Second, one
purpose may lead to another. An officer may sit in his car, for example, for the purpose
of observing traffic, which is done for the purpose of writing speeding tickets, which in
turn is for the purpose of maintaining safe roads. The MPD may take an action for the
purpose of political intelligence while simultaneously being motivated by a genuine
desire to preserve public safety. Third, the Court notes that infringements on personal 
liberty are often accompanied by appeals to public safety.
Id. at 19. 
198. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 536 (2012) (“Because the police power is
controlled by 50 different States instead of one national sovereign, the facets of governing that
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legislation. As Berkeley Law Professor Catherine Crump explains, for 
example, because the federal government largely funds local 
surveillance technology, it can likely condition the receipt of that 
funding on certain requirements.199 She suggests three requirements in 
particular: (1) expanding local involvement in decisions about 
technology acquisition; (2) disclosing information on the impact of
surveillance technology to local representatives; and (3) “requir[ing] 
that surveillance technologies be governed by use policies.”200 Building
on that argument, the substance of the Memphis Consent Decree can
be transformed into a federal “use policy” that governs surveillance 
technology.201 
Nevertheless, given that the power to regulate police departments 
is typically reserved to states and that gridlock often stalls federal
legislation, the legislation advocated for in this Note is likely most 
viable on a state and local level. But an immediate practical issue
emerges: Why would states or local governments ever want to impose
such a limitation on themselves? As it turns out, “states have been
remarkably active” in regulating police surveillance.202 This is largely
because state governments are more directly accountable to the 
touch on citizens’ daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the
governed.”).
199. See Crump, supra note 40, at 1656–59 (discussing federal remedies). 
200. Id.
201. One lingering concern is that conditioning the receipt of these funds might be an
unconstitutional violation of Congress’s Spending Powers under South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987), which requires conditional spending to (1) promote the general welfare, (2) be
unambiguous, (3) be germane to the particular federal interest, (4) not be independently
unconstitutional, and (5) not be “so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into
compulsion.’” Id. at 207–08, 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 
(1937)). Here, the Dole test likely does not pose a significant issue given that the spending
requirements would not create such an immense burden on the states as to be coercive and is
tailored to the particular federal interest of protecting the First Amendment rights of protesters.
 202. Crump, supra note 40, at 1659 (emphasis added). Professor Crump supports this
contention by providing three recent statutes as examples:
[I]n 2015, California passed a comprehensive law, the California Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, requiring warrants for digital records of emails, texts,
and geolocation information, even when the data is stored in the cloud by service 
providers. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1546–1546.4 (West 2016). Virginia enacted legislation
requiring law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant (except in limited
circumstances) before employing a drone. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2–60.1 (2015). North 
Carolina adopted a bill that requires state and local agencies employing license plate
readers to adopt a written use policy and sets limitations on data retention without a 
warrant. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-183.22–24 (2015). 
Id. at n.303.
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public.203 Therefore, when police departments have surveilled local 
populations, “public ire targeted these departments’ respective city 
councils,”204 meaning as public pressure mounts, such policies could
instill legitimacy where legitimacy otherwise sits on shaky ground.205 
CONCLUSION
As a well-known Memphis activist, Tami Sawyer organized 
multiple protests in the years leading up to 2018, including protests to
remove confederate statues.206 She reported being personally yelled at 
and followed by police officers during and after protests, and court 
records from City of Memphis revealed that she was one of the
protesters that MPD surveilled.207 But on August 3, 2018, Sawyer was 
elected to the Shelby County Board of Commissioners, meaning that— 
in an ironic turn of events—“she can [now] keep tabs on the people 
who were keeping tabs on her.”208 
From individuals like Sawyer to organizations like the ACLU, the 
history of Memphis shows that even when police departments have a 
genuine and valid concern for public safety, protesters still have a 
genuine and valid claim to protest without governmental interference, 
to speak without being recorded, and to appear without being 
followed. Although the Constitution may not explicitly protect these
acts, the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments implicitly encode 
the principle of privacy that underlies them.  
Unfortunately, police departments across the country have taken
advantage of the constitutional gray zone that exists in this arena. 
Because it is unlikely that these constitutional ambiguities will be 
resolved anytime soon, this Note calls upon the legislature to step in 
and provide a solution modeled after the Memphis Consent Decree. It 
is important to note, however, that the issues surrounding surveillance 
will continue to develop in the age of technology, often beyond what 
203. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (“The federal Constitution forms a 
happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national,
the local and particular to the State legislatures.”).
 204. Crump, supra note 40, at 1650. 
205. See, e.g., id. at 1659–60 (discussing the passage of state legislation after protests in
Ferguson).
 206. Brentin Mock, Memphis: Spying on Activists Is Just Good Police Work, CITYLAB (Aug. 
9, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/08/memphis-spying-on-activists-is-just-good-
police-work/567101 [https://perma.cc/TWP7-PF7H].
 207. Id.
 208. Id.
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any individual can reasonably predict. So, while Memphis tells a
hopeful story, its lessons provide only a starting point. Much work
remains to be done. 
